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Del-Ray Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Henderson Petroleum Corp.:
Warranty Owed by Assignors and Sublessors of Mineral

Interests
In Louisiana, a well established distinction exists between an assignment and a sublease of a mineral lease. An assignment, which
involves a transfer of all rights in a lease, is treated as an ordinary
sale governed by the Civil Code articles on sales, while a sublease, which
results when the transferor retains some interest in the lease, is treated
as an ordinary mineral lease governed by the Mineral Code and the
Civil Code articles on lease.' In Del-Ray Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Henderson
Petroleum Corp.,2 the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal was
recently faced with determining what effect this distinction has on the
warranty owed by an assignor and that owed by a sublessor as the
result of a transfer of mineral interests.'
Henderson Petroleum purchased a forty-nine percent interest in a
mineral lease from each Del-Ray Oil and Krutzer, and the remaining
two percent interest from Latour. This suit arose when Henderson learned
that the landowner, who assumed that the lease had expired, had negotiated a new lease with a third party. Henderson settled with both
Del-Ray Oil and the third party lessee, and proceeded against Krutzer
and Latour charging breach of warranty.
The court held that Krutzer's transfer was a sublease, as Krutzer
had reserved a "one-sixteenth working interest in the property, ' 4 and
that Latour's transfer was an assignment, since Latour had conveyed
all of his interest to Henderson. As an assignment, Latour's transfer
was held to be subject to the warranty provisions of the Louisiana Civil
Code articles pertaining to sales. Conversely, the court found that Krutzer's sublease was "subject to article 120 of the Mineral Code, which
allows mineral lessors to exclude warranty of title, rather than the

Copyright 1987, by

LOUISIANA LAW REviEw.

1. Broussard v. Hassie Hunt Trust, 231 La. 474, 91 So. 2d 762 (1956); Tomlinson
v. Thurmon, 189 La. 959, 181 So. 458 (1938).
2. 797 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1986).
3. Also at issue was whether the lease had expired or whether certain work performed
on the land constituted reworking operations which would have continued the existence
of the lease. If the lease had expired, then the warranty issue would also have had to
have been determined on remand.
4. Since only a "working interest" was retained, as opposed to an overriding royalty,
the transfer may not have been a sublease; however, neither party questioned this. See
Broussard, 231 La. at 481-82, 91 So. 2d at 764-65; 8 H. Williams & J. Meyers, Oil and
Gas Law 838 (Matthew Bender 1981).
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conflicting articles of the Civil Code" which apply to an assignment.5
The court then remanded the case to the district court with instructions
to apply the appropriate codal authority.
This note will discuss the warranties owed by an assignor to an
assignee and by a sublessor to a sublessee, including any differences
between the two, and will raise certain material questions that should
have been asked by the court in Del-Ray Oil.
Warranty Owed by an Assignor Under the Civil Code
The Louisiana Mineral Code provides specifically for agreements in
which a lease or sublease of mineral interests is created, but does not
address the assignment of mineral interests.6 It has long been decided
that since the assignor retains no interest in an assignment of either a
corporeal or an incorporeal, 7 the assignor is treated as an ordinary
vendor.' The court in Del-Ray Oil looked to the Civil Code to determine
what warranty this vendor, Latour, owed, but failed to recognize that
this warranty was practically the same as that owed by lessors and
sublessors under the Mineral Code. Two warranties imposed by the Civil
Code on vendors are the warranty against eviction and the warranty of
the existence of the incorporeal assigned. 9
Warranty Against Eviction
The warranty against eviction guarantees the purchaser's "peaceable
possession,"' 0 unless excluded by agreement of the parties. In Del-Ray
Oil, the landowner's creation of a new lease disturbed Henderson's
peaceable possession, but recovery for eviction was not automatic, since
in Latour's assignment to Henderson the parties had stipulated that the
transfer was being made " 'without warranty either express or implied.' "" Inclusion of this stipulation necessitated application of Civil
Code article 2505. Article 2505 provides: "Even in case of stipulation
of no warranty, the seller, in case of eviction, is liable to a restitution
of the price, unless the buyer was aware, at the time of the sale, of
the danger of the eviction, and purchased at his peril and risk."' 2

5. Del-Ray Oil, 797 F.2d at 1317 (emphasis added).
6. La. R.S. 31:120 (1975).
7. Tomlinson, 189 La. at 961, 181 So. at 460.
8. Id. at 962, 181 So. at 460.
9. La. Civ. Code art. 2476 sets out the warranties owed by the seller. La. Civ.
Code arts. 2500-2519 pertain to the warranty against eviction in particular. La. Civ. Code
art. 2646 addresses the warranty of the existence of incorporeals.
10. La. Civ. Code art. 2476.
11. Del-Ray Oil, 797 F.2d at 1317.
12. La. Civ. Code art. 2505 (emphasis added).
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The prevailing interpretation of article 2505 was established long
ago by the Louisiana Supreme Court in New Orleans & Carrollton
Railroad Co. v. Jourdain's Heirs.3 The court interpreted article 2505
as providing for two types of warranty stipulations. Under the first type
of stipulation, the parties exclude warranty by an express clause in their
agreement, but they do not intend that the warranty against eviction
be excluded, and the purchaser has no knowledge of the danger of
eviction. If the purchaser is later evicted, this type of clause frees the
seller from damages, but the purchase price must be returned.14 In the
second type of stipulation, the purchaser buys expressly "at his peril
and risk," and no restitution of purchase price is required upon eviction." Therefore, under Jourdain, for a purchaser to buy "at his peril
and risk," there must be either a clause expressly excluding warranty,
along with "actual knowledge"' 6 of the danger of eviction, or simply
an express stipulation that the sale is made "at purchaser's peril and
risk." This interpretation of the "unless clause" in article 2505 creates
two separate tests, either of which when satisfied makes the transfer at
the assignee's "peril and risk," because the court construed the conjunctive "and" in article 2505 as the disjunctive "or."' 7 This interpretation is consistent with the Code Napoleon provision from which article
2505 was derived.' 8

Further jurisprudential interpretation of article 2505 has permitted
the same results as from an express stipulation of "at purchaser's peril
and risk" to be achieved by inclusion of quitclaim terminology in the
contract of sale.' 9 Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co. 20 held

that, to determine if a transfer is a quitclaim deed, the language of the
agreement must be considered to ascertain whether it was the parties'

intent to convey "only the right, title and interest of the vendor." ' 2' As
under Jourdain, the intent of the parties must be determined before the
correct interpretation can be given to the agreement. Jourdain and

13.

34 La. Ann. 648 (1882).

14. Jourdain, 34 La. Ann. at 650.

15. Id.at 650-51.
16. Id. at 652 ("[actual knowledge] which must be brought home to him by direct
proof, or by implication from references to, or proof of, collateral facts, so strong to

be the equivalent thereto").
17.

Id.at 650.

18. French C. Civ. art. 1629 provides: "Even in case of stipulation of no warranty,
the seller, in case of eviction, is liable to a restitution of the price, unless the buyer was
aware, at the time of the sale, of the danger of eviction, or purchased at his peril and
risk." (emphasis added).
19. Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 213 La. 588, 35 So. 2d 225 (1947);
Butler v. Bazemore, 303 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1962).
20. 213 La. 588, 35 So. 2d 225 (1947).
21. Id. at 602, 35 So. 2d at 230.
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Waterman should give guidance in the application of article 2505 to an
assignment of a mineral lease. They suggest that one should look at
the knowledge and intent of the parties, as well as the wording of their
agreement.
In the agreement under which Latour transferred his interest to
Henderson, the parties stipulated that the transfer was being made
" 'without warranty either express or implied.' "22 In analyzing this
stipulation, the court emphasized the importance of determining whether
Henderson had actual knowledge at the time of the transfer of the
danger of eviction, and remanded the case for such a determination.
The court dismissed the need for any further analysis of whether the
wording of the stipulation supported a waiver of the warranty of eviction,
on the grounds that prior jurisprudence found similar language not to
have been the equivalent of a quitclaim deed.23 This was the extent of
the court's analysis of the remedy afforded by article 2505. Despite
Jourdain and Waterman, the court failed to suggest that on remand
the lower court should evaluate the intent of the parties in including
the warranty stipulation. Moreover, by simply relying on an analysis of
similar language in a different agreement which was the subject of dispute
in an entirely different case, the court illustrated that the intent of the
parties was not at all a consideration in its resolution of the warranty
issue, for intent is a unique element in every contract, and can only be
uncovered through independent analysis of the agreement at hand. With
all due respect, for the court neither to engage in such an independent
analysis, nor to require the lower court to do so on remand, was error
in light of the Louisiana jurisprudence.
Louisiana courts have experience in applying an analysis similar to
that delineated by Jourdain and Waterman in determining whether an
agreement is a "compromise," as provided for in article 3071 of the
Civil Code. Those courts have consistently held that the agreement need
not expressly state that it is a compromise, if the required intent of the
parties reciprocally to make concessions to end or prevent a lawsuit is
expressed in the agreement. 24 Because the outcome of the lawsuit is
undetermined, the parties are uncertain as to what they are transferring
(i.e., what right they may be giving up), but each side's hope of gaining
is balanced by its fear of losing. This is analogous to the assignment
of a mineral lease by which the assignor transfers what interest he owns
and neither party has any intent that the transfer be warranted. In either

22. Del-Ray Oil, 797 F.2d at 1317.
23. Id. at 1318. The court cited Sabine Prod. Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.,
432 So. 2d 1047, 1052-53 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
24. Gaylor v. Copes, 16 F. 49 (E.D. La. 1883); Karl Hansen Co. v. Beekman, 16
La. App. 112, 132 So. 799 (1931); Eaglin v. Southern Kraft Corp., 200 So. 63 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1941).
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situation it is the intent, as expressed in the agreement, that determines
what meaning is given to the agreement. A similar analysis is also used
in determining whether an agreement is a sale of a hope under Civil
Code article 2451.25
Warranty of Existence
In evaluating Henderson's rights against Latour, the court in DelRay Oil also addressed the additional complication created by Civil Code
article 2646, which provides for the warranty of existence that applies
to the sale of an incorporeal right. In the end, however, the court left
the decision of its applicability to the lower court. 26 The court was
uncertain as to whether this warranty was operative, simply because,
under a literal reading of 2646, the article would not have applied to
the Del-Ray Oil facts. Article 2646 provides: "He who sells a credit or
an incorporeal right, warrants its existence at the time of the transfer
though no warranty be mentioned in the deed. ' 27 Since it is unclear
whether article 2646 was intended to create an implied warranty of
existence only if warranty was not mentioned, or rather whether or not
warranty was mentioned, it is helpful to look to the history of article
2646 and to how the courts have previously applied the article.
According to Planiol, under French law a seller warrants the existence
of an incorporeal right at the time of the transfer; however, this warranty
can be modified or excluded in the same manner as allowed by the
Louisiana Civil Code with respect to the implied warranty against evic2
tion. 1
The Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently held that both the
warranty against eviction and the warranty of existence apply to the
sale of an incorporeal. 29 The court in Del-Ray Oil mentioned the correct
translation of the original Code Napoleon article which provides for the
warranty of existence even though " 'it be made without warranty,' "
referring to the agreement itself, rather than "though no warranty be

25. La. Civ. Code art. 2451 provides for the sale of an "uncertain hope." The
supreme court in Jourdain recognized the sale of an "uncertain hope" as a means of
contracting at the purchaser's "peril and risk." 34 La. Ann. 651 (1882); see also St.
Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 33 So. 2d 169 (1947) (sale of a mineral
royalty is a sale of an uncertain hope).
26. Del-Ray Oil, 797 F.2d at 1318-19.
27. La. Civ. Code art. 2646 (emphasis added).
28. 2 M. Planiol §§ 1629, 1632, at 904, 905 (1lth ed. 1959); Jourdain, 34 La. Ann.
at 650.
29. Corcoran v. Riddell, 7 La. Ann. 268 (1852); Tomlinson, 189 La. 959, 181 So.
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mentioned in the deed," as appears in our present article 2646.30 This
correct translation, along with Planiol's comments would suggest that
article 2646 creates an implied warranty of existence, whether warranty
is mentioned or not, which can be excluded in the same manner as the
warranty against eviction. This is the logical meaning of article 2646;
however, the courts have not always applied the article in this manner.
In Lemoine v. City of Shreveport,3 the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that in a transfer of paving certificates, without recourse, article
2646 did not apply since warranty was mentioned in the agreement; the
court applied article 2505 instead. Thus the court, due to the illogical
result produced from a literal reading of article 2646, used article 2505
to define the warranty of the existence of incorporeals that was intended
to be defined by article 2646. Nevertheless, the court reached a logical
and fair result despite the ambiguous language of article 2646 by using
the "unless" clause in article 2505 to determine whether restitution of
the purchase price was appropriate.
Similarly, in the early Louisiana Supreme Court case of Jenkins v.
Parish of Caddo,3 2 the court resorted to the "principle" of the rule of
article 2505, to determine whether the purchase of an incorporeal "without recourse" was made at the purchaser's "peril and risk." Although
the court did not, as in Lemoine, find that the inclusion of warranty
language precluded application of the warranty of existence, it resolved
the issue, as in Lemoine, according to the standards employed under
the analysis used with respect to the warranty against eviction. 3
34
The confusion that exists in the jurisprudence is unsatisfactory.
The most sensible approach is that the warranty of existence applies
even when the parties have made a reference to warranty in their
agreement, and that the critical determination is what the parties intended
by that reference. This determination should involve consideration of
the same factors as those resorted to in the analysis under the warranty
against eviction. Ultimately, the problem is not with the results achieved
by the courts, but with the lack of a sensible and straightforward
approach.

30.

Del-Ray Oil, 797 F.2d at 1318. See also French C. Civ. art. 1693 (1976) ("even

though it be made without guaranty") and La. Civ. Code art. 2646 (history of article
mentions translation error).
31. 184 La. 221, 165 So. 873 (1936).
32. 7 La. Ann. 559, 561 (1852).
33. Id.at 561.
34. See Jenkins, 7 La. Ann. at 561 (The transfer was made without recourse; however,
the court held that the parties had not agreed to exclude the warranty of existence.);
Corcoran, 7 La. Ann at 269 (The court held that even though the transfer was made
without recourse, the incorporeal right must be in existence.); Note, Mines and MineralsOil and Gas-Assignment of Lease-Warranty Against Eviction-Article 2505, Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870, 13 Tul. L. Rev. 471 (1938-39).
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Warranty Owed by a Sublessor Under the Mineral Code
In analyzing the warranty issues concerning Krutzer's sublease, the
court in Del-Ray Oil correctly stated: "The provisions in the Louisiana
Mineral Code that control the rights and obligations of lessors and
lessees of mineral rights also control the rights and obligations of sublessors and sublessees of mineral rights."" Thus, the court found article
120 of the Louisiana Mineral Code, which allows a lessor/sublessor to
exclude warranty of title, to be controlling.3 6 Ultimately, the court required the lower court on remand to make a factual finding as to
whether the parties intended to warrant title;3 7 that disposition of the
issue is not questioned here. What is questioned, however, is the court's
statement that: "In contrast to articles 2505 and 2646 of the Civil Code,
article 120 of the Mineral Code provides that a mineral lessor may
exclude warranty of title.''3 Again, the court was suggesting that some
difference exists between the warranties under the two codes. In the
following paragraphs, the application of the Mineral Code to a lease/
sublease will be discussed, and compared with the application of the
Civil Code to an assignment.
Before the adoption of the Mineral Code, the mineral lessor, like
ordinary lessors under the Civil Code, warranted peaceable possession,
but did not warrant title. 9 Consequently, if a mineral lessee discovered
a defect in the lessor's title or that the lessor's title covered only a
portion of the mineral rights, the lessee could not complain until his
occupancy was actually disturbed.4 Under Mineral Code article 120,
mineral lessors now warrant title, which means that the lessee no longer
has to wait until occupancy is actually disturbed to bring an action . 4
It is notable, however, that the adoption of the Mineral Code in general,

35.

Del-Ray Oil, 797 F.2d at 1316.

36. La. R.S. 31:120 (1975) provides:
A mineral lessor impliedly warrants title to the interest leased unless such
warranty is expressly excluded or limited. The liability of the lessor for breach
of warranty is limited to recovery of money paid or other property or its value
given to the lessor for execution or maintenance of the lease and any royalties
delivered on production from the lease.
37. Del-Ray Oil, 797 F.2d at 1317.
38. Id. at 1316-17 (emphasis added).
39. La. Civ. Code arts. 2682, 2692; Coyle v. North Am. Oil Consol., 201 La. 99,
114, 9 So. 2d 473, 478; Dees v. Hunt Oil Co., 123 F. Supp. 58, 60 (W.D. La. 1954).
40. Sabine Lumber Co. v. Broderick, 88 F.2d 586, 588 (5th Cir. 1937); Williams v.
Reynolds, 448 So. 2d 845, 847 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
41. When a lessor expressly warranted title, before warranty of title was codified in
the Mineral Code, the court held actual eviction was not a condition precedent to recovery.
Berwick Mud Co. v. Stansbury, 205 So. 2d 147, 151 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967). With the
codification of the warranty of title, the courts should reach the same result in cases
decided since the Mineral Code.
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and of article 120 in particular, has not rendered obsolete the warranty
of peaceable possession imposed by the Civil Code. The Mineral Code
clearly provides that where pertinent Civil Code articles on lease do not
conflict with the Mineral Code articles, the Civil Code articles are also
applicable. 42 The warranty of peaceable possession provided for by the
Civil Code is certainly not in conflict with the warranty of title now
imposed by the Mineral Code. Accordingly, a mineral lessor under the
Mineral Code still owes the warranty of peaceable possession under Civil
4
Code articles 2682 and 2692. 1
Prior to the adoption of the Mineral Code, it was customary for
the parties to a mineral lease to include a "warranty of title clause.""
Article 120 of the Mineral Code codified this practice, and in addition
specifically provided that this warranty could be "expressly excluded,"
and limited recovery if warranty of title was breached. 4 The warranty
of title under article 120 is the near equivalent of a vendor/assignor's
warranty against eviction. 46 Thus, if a mineral lessor breaches this warranty of title, the lessee will be in the same situation as a vendee/
assignee who has been evicted under the Civil Code. Whether the breach
of warranty is referred to as a breach of the warranty against eviction
or of title should make little difference as to the availability of a right
of action.
Therefore, the distinction that once existed between the warranty
owed by the assignor and by the sublessor would then have related only
to when an action could be brought. The distinction as to when the
suit may be brought, generally, does not exist today.4 7 Other differences
are also difficult to detect. A lessor impliedly warrants title under the
Mineral Code and impliedly warrants against eviction under both the
Civil Code andi the Mineral Code. 4s And, although an assignor impliedly
warrants only against eviction of the vendee under the Civil Code, the
language of Civil Code articles 2500 and 2501 includes within the def-

42. La. R.S. 31:2 (1975).
43. La. Civ. Code arts. 2682 and 2692 obligate the lessor to deliver the thing, maintain
the thing, and cause the lessee to remain in peaceable possession. Similar obligations also
appear in the Mineral Code, La. R.S. 31:119 (1975).
44. La. R.S. 31:120 (1975) (Comments to article 120 of the Mineral Code discuss
the customary practice of including a warranty of title clause in the lease.).
45. Id.
46. La. Civ. Code arts. 2500-2501. The terminology used in these articles will cover
many of the situations contemplated under article 120 of the Mineral Code. See infra
text accompanying notes 49-50. For a good discussion of the eroding distinction between
the warranty against eviction and the warranty of title in Louisiana, see Comment,
"Warranty of Title" or Warranty of Peaceable Possession in Louisiana, 15 Tul. L. Rev.
115 (1940-41).
47. Comment, supra note 46.
48. La. R.S. 31:120-121 (1975); La. Civ. Code arts. 2682, 2692.
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inition of eviction most situations contemplated under the "warranty of
title" provision in the Mineral Code. 49 The courts generally have had
no trouble in finding that the assignee has been evicted as required for
the application of the Civil Code articles.5 0
In Del-Ray Oil, Henderson Petroleum was both an assignee and a
sublessee. Whether we say Henderson was evicted or that it held a title
that failed is irrelevant. The court actually did not have to choose,

because with regard to the assignment, Henderson had been evicted,
and with regard to the sublease, the warranty of title had been breached.
The issue presented involved the type of relief that was required under
the two codes (i.e., whether return of the purchase price would be
appropriate).
In the leading case involving the application of the Mineral Code
warranty provisions to leases and subleases, the court avoided the confusion that has resulted from the application of the Civil Code to
assignments. No confusing distinctions were made between warranty
against eviction, warranty of existence, and transfers at the purchaser's
"peril and risk." Instead, in applying the Mineral Code, the court
recognized that the parties' contractual freedom to "expressly" exclude
warranty of title deserved the utmost attention. 1
In Texas General Petroleum Corp. v. Brown,5 2 the Louisiana Second
Circuit Court of Appeal made it clear that the wording of the agreement
must be considered to determine what intent the parties had when they
entered into it. In Brown, the lessee wished to recover the bonus paid

49. La. Civ. Code art. 2500 provides: "Eviction is the loss suffered by the buyer of
the totality of the thing sold, or of a part thereof, occasioned by the right or claims of
a third person." (emphasis added); La. Civ. Code art. 2501 provides:
Although at the time of the sale no stipulations have been made respecting the
warranty, the seller is obliged, of course, to warrant the buyer against the
eviction suffered by him from the totality or part of the thing sold, and against
the charges claimed on such thing, which were not declared at the time of the
sale.
(emphasis added).
50. See Jourdain, 34 La. Ann. 648 (1882); Toler v. Swayze, 2 La. Ann. 880 (1847);
Templeman v. Hamilton & Co., 37 La. Ann. 754 (1885); Tomlinson, 189 La. 959, 181
So. 458. For cases in which the court held that the buyer need not actually be dispossessed,
see McDonald & Coon v. Vaughan, 14 La. Ann. 716, 718 (1859); Bonvillain v. Bodenheimer, 117 La. 793, 807-08, 42 So. 273, 277-78 (1960). See also S. Litvinoff, Sale and Lease
in the Louisiana Jurisprudence 342-51 (2d rev. ed. 1986).
51. Texas Gen. Petroleum Corp. v. Brown, 408 So. 2d 288, 289 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1981); La. R.S. 31:120 (1975). By creating an implied warranty of title, Mineral Code
article 120 codified the customary practice of including a warranty of title clause in every
mineral lease. Such clauses, in pre-Mineral Code cases, were enforced in recognition of
the parties contractual freedom and no change has resulted from the codification of this
practice. Berwick Mud Co., 205 So. 2d 147, 151.
52. 408 So. 2d 288 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
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to the lessor when the lessor allegedly breached his warranty of title.
The court looked at the wording of the agreement and decided that the
warranty was excluded. The court stated: "Each lease excluded warranty
against pre-existing leases, the existence of which were known by [the]
lessee.""3 The court held that where the agreement "expressly excluded"
warranty as to possible pre-existing leases, the lessee could not later
54
complain that the lessor had breached his warranty of title.
The court's analysis in Brown contained consideration of factors
similar to those used in the warranty analysis developed under the Civil
Code provisions concerning assignments-i.e., the wording of the agreement, the knowledge of any danger, and the intention of the parties.
Thus, not only are the actions for breach of warranty under the Mineral
and Civil Codes triggered by similar fact patterns, but the analysis used
is in the end indistinguishable.
Assignment or Sublease: What are the Real Questions?
The distinction between an assignment and a sublease of a mineral
lease will surely continue in Louisiana for reasons other than warranty."
This author suggests that in cases such as Del-Ray Oil, where warranty
is the issue, this distinction should only lead the courts to the appropriate
code articles, but should not affect the analysis used.
In Del-Ray Oil, there was both an assignment and a sublease of
mineral interests. The assignment contained a stipulation that "excluded
any express or implied warranty" and the sublease contained a stipulation
"that excluded warranty of title.''56 As to assignments, the courts must
determine whether the clause was merely an express clause excluding
warranty, and if so, whether there was actual knowledge of any danger.
If both of these factors are present, the transfer should be considered
made at the assignee's risk. Alternatively, the courts must consider
whether the parties intended that the clause alone create a transfer at
the assignee's risk.57 The court must go through the same analysis to
discover the intent of the parties before they can determine the warranty,
if any, owed by the sublessor to the sublessee. When the courts seek
to discover the intention of the parties as expressed in the agreements,

53. Id. at 289.
54. Id. at 291. The court found that the parties' knowledge of the danger of preexisting leases was the reason for the inclusion of the clause excluding warranty in the
agreement.
55. The distinction still guides the relationship, as to matters other than warranty,
between the parties; the lessor, lessee, assignor and assignee; the lessor, lessee, sublessor,
and sublessee.
56. 797 F.2d at 1314.
57. Jourdain, 34 La. Ann. at 650-51; Waterman, 213 La. at 602, 35 So. 2d at 230.
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the interpretation of the same clause excluding warranty, in two different
cases, can result in completely opposite holdings.
In searching for the parties' intent, it is possible that a court could
determine that each party intended that a different meaning be given
to their agreement. This author suggests that at that point in the analysis,
warranty will no longer provide appropriate relief. The question which
must then be raised is how differing the contracting parties' intentions
must be before a court would decide that there is error as to the cause,
which would nullify the contract, and avoid the warranty issue completely." Such an inquiry can only appropriately be made, however,
after an initial evaluation of the intent of the parties.
Steven Jess Sperry

58. See, e.g., Lyons Milling Co. v. Cusimano, 161 La. 198, 108 So. 414 (1926);
Calhoun v. Teal, 106 La. 47, 30 So. 288 (1901); Deutschman v. Standard Fur Co., Inc.,
331 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).

